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Ideologically Oriented Enterprises Faced with the 
Reconfiguration of Ethics and Spiritual Management 
Louis-Léon Christians1 
 The question of religion in the workplace is as old as the concept 
of work and . . . religion. For the better, and sometimes for the 
worse, both concern the salvation of mankind: the meaning of life 
and eternal salvation in the case of religion, and the subsistence and 
dignity in this earthly world in the case of work. In contrast to those 
age-old concepts, employment law seems clearly more modern and 
with it the slow progress of human rights doctrine.2 
“Employment law was first of all concerned with protecting the 
employee against the religious hold of some employers who, 
following a paternalist way of thinking, wished to bring salvation to 
the employees,” wrote François Gaudu in 2010.3 Gaudu presented 
those times as definitively over except for a “small revival at the end 
of the 1970s, when a few foreign companies wanted to force their 
employees to perform spiritual practices.”4 
The secularization of Western societies and the across-the-board 
acquisition of individual human rights have been a major turning 
point in the modern relationship between work and religion.5 The 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and privacy are at the heart of 
work relationships. This is a guarantee codified by non-
discrimination policies that protect religious beliefs or affiliations.6 
Religious questions are no longer to disturb the now “secularized” 
(and in some ways “deprivatized”) work relationship as a result of 
the influence of these fundamental rights. 
 
 1. Université Catholique de Louvain, working under a EU-FP7-Religare Grant. 
 2. Alain Supiot, Orare/Laborare, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 641, 641–53 (2009); 
Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and the Workplace: A Social Science Perspective, 30 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL. J., 471, 471–84 (2009). 
 3. François Gaudu, La religion dans l’entreprise, 2010 DROIT SOCIAL, 65 (Fr.); 
François Gaudu, Droit du travail et religion, 2008 DROIT SOCIAL, 959 (Fr.). 
 4. Gaudu, La religion dans l’enterprise, supra note 3. 
 5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc 
A/810, at 71 (1948). 
 6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2014). 
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How, then, can one explain the increasingly intense controversy 
relating to religion in the workplace? Some may argue that the recent 
controversies are simply a sign of an improved effectiveness of the 
control processes. But this seems too simple an explanation and a 
variety of data and facts seem to show that, on the contrary, new 
difficulties are emerging, which are not only more numerous but 
which are of a different variety compared with those of the past. 7 
First, the vast movement of secularization of Western European 
societies was made more complex by a movement of religious 
minorization and diversification linked as much to individualist 
reconstructions as to issues of more collective integration. These 
phenomena lead to dynamics of reaffirmation and anti-conformism 
that are even more complex to manage, given that they are 
increasingly diversified. At the beginning of the twenty-first century 
in Europe, conflict over Islamic practices arose most frequently, with 
employees seeking accommodations to wear headscarves or beards, 
or requesting their employers provide prayer rooms and special 
menus in cafeterias, etc.8 But, in fact, these Islamic issues are actually 
part of a much broader phenomenon which has existed, in one form 
or another, for a long time with Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, pacifists, 
homosexuals, and even those belonging to previously dominant 
religions.9 To consider as complete, in a too hasty or too imperative 
manner, a social secularization of the labor pool further strengthens 
reactions that are, in fact, linked to a gap between normative 
positions and the much more complex sociological state of 
populations. 
A second development further complicates the situation. The 
spread of market rationality leads, in effect, to new fertilizations 
between economic markets and spiritual markets. Once again, it is 
not simply a matter here of recalling the rapid emergence in Europe 
of Islamic modes of finance, trade, or industry. It is rather a question 
of paying attention to the deeper renewal of a pluralism of economic 
legitimacies linked to reference points such as business “ethics,” 
 
 7. Lucy Vickers, Celebrating Diversity? The Implementation of the European Non-
Discrimination Directives in the UK, 13 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 279 (2006) 
(Neth.). 
 8. DOUNIA BOUZAR & LYLIA BOUZAR, ALLAH, A-T-IL SA PLACE DANS L’ENTREPRISE? 
(2009); Sonia Ghumman et al., Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: A Review and 
Examination of Current and Future Trends, 28 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 439, 445 (2013). 
 9. Ghumman et al., supra note 8, at 441. 
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“culture,” and “participative management.” What difference, then, 
should we see between the appearance of the fast-food restaurant, 
Quick’s, that prepares meat in accordance with Islamic law and the 
secular business culture of Coca-Cola? Or, between the networks of 
Club bookshops or the Oxfam and Max Havelaar fair-trade chains, 
and even the long-standing development of ethnic shops, from the 
Chinese or kosher restaurant to Pakistani grocery stores and women-
only fitness centers? 
In at least one of its facets, this second development is different 
in nature than the first. With the first, society’s degree of 
“secularization” depends on factual observation of external practices, 
beliefs, and social (de)structuring. In this view, the work relation was 
a purely reactive one in the face of a social given.10 That reaction 
depends on the type of exception or, in more recent and perhaps 
inopportune vocabulary, on the manner of the social compromise or 
arrangement. The second development referenced business culture 
or economic ethics, relating more directly to a normative11 or 
regulatory approach: to what extent can an employer decide and state 
its own “ethics” or “culture,” which for the employer might be of 
the order of a principle and not of an exceptional adaptation? This 
normative business perspective does not imply extreme 
communitarianism nor extreme intuitu personae. It is not an 
arbitrary claim, but an objective reference to a particular ethical 
project, often geared toward benefiting minorities. It is this question 
that will be one of the major issues in the law of non-discrimination 
and in a renewed theory of “ideologically oriented enterprises.” In 
 
 10. See e.g., Basil C. Bitas & Pedro P. Barros, Tobacco Control and the Role of Litigation: 
A Survey of Issues in Law, Policy, and Economics, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 40 
(2008) (discussing businesses that “changed their behavior in order to find a new 
‘business space’ adapted to prevailing social perceptions and circumstances”); Matthew G. 
Doré, Déjà Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule and Entity Law Convergence 
Patterns in Europe and the United States, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 332 (2014) 
(“Firms are in fact embedded in their nation’s social context, which company law rules 
reflect.”); Nathaniel Lipkus, How to Understand Product Development: Public-Private 
Partnerships as Vehicles for Innovation in Combating Neglected Disease, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. 
& LAW 385, 423 (2006) (mentioning an initiative which identified “companies which have 
historically adapted to economic and political circumstances”). 
 11. See Timothy L. Fort, Religion in the Workplace: Mediating Religion’s Good, Bad and 
Ugly Naturally, 12 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 121, 136 (1998) (“In terms of business 
ethics, however, a person’s ethical stance, religious or otherwise, is about the treatment of 
others and therefore can never be private. While belief is undoubtedly a matter of private 
conscience, the ethical duties derived from such beliefs are, at least to some degree, public.”). 
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any case, it is an even more difficult question, since the transposition 
to private businesses of the rules of ideological neutrality 
characteristic of public institutions does not seem to have acquired 
constitutional force. The assumption is that extending these public 
rules to private enterprise result in solutions rather than serious 
questions about interpretative discussion of both secularism (as in 
France) and neutrality (as in Belgium). 
The first kind of workplace diversity (internal diversity of 
standard businesses), with issues like management of workers’ 
freedom of conscience and religion, could become an outdated issue 
faster than expected. However, new forms of corporate vision (like 
emphasis on fostering external diversity of ideologically oriented 
enterprises) and more precisely contemporary reformulations of 
business ethics and spiritualities would demand new analyses from 
positive law. Continuing the line of thought begun in previous 
publications, this article will make a few observations bearing on the 
challenges of this new issue. 
How can one legally analyze what might the impact of new 
business ethics, certifications, charters, and plans be on cultural and 
religious diversity? New forms of indirect discrimination might 
conceal themselves ever more skillfully, attempting to get round the 
advances in new anti-discrimination legislation. Not all specifications 
of an ethics or business culture necessarily result in a bias of 
discrimination, whether philosophical or political. Nowadays, ethnic 
and ethical claims tend to be mingled12 and broaden into new and 
more extensive forms of ethical businesses. 
 
 12. The growing complexity of the respective figures of ethnicity, ethics and culture, 
and identity and profit, may complicate the analysis and conventional types. Comp. O. De 
Schutter tries to distinguish a gay bar from a Chinese restaurant : “[D]ans le cas de 
l’établissement destines aux homosexuels, la possibilité pour ceux-ci de se retrouver entre eux 
pet être considérée omme une condition de leur épanouissement personnel, c’est-à-dire 
comme un element de la vie privée. Encore les deux hypothèses ne sont-elles pas à confondre : 
tandis que dans le rpemier cas (retaurant éthnique chinois), c’est l’intérêt économique de 
l’établissement qu’il invoque pour pretender échapper à l’interdiction de la discrimination 
directe fondée sur l’orignie ethnique, dans le second cas (bar homosexuel), c’est le souhait des 
membres d’une minorité de pouvoir se retrouver entre eux qui est invoqué comme 
justification. Le conflit entre libertés fondamentales n’est véritable que dans cette dernière 
situation : dans la première situation, la seule question pertinente est celle de savoir quelle 
portée reconnaître au principe de proportionnalité que contient la disposition que les directives 
consacrent à la notion “d’exigence professionnelle.” [In the case of the gay bar, the 
opportunity for gays to get together amongst each other could be considered necessary for 
their personal development, or in other words, an element of their private life. The two 
hypotheses should not be confused though: In the first case, (the Chinese Restaurant) the 
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But the development of cultural diversity within business does 
not stop there. Business culture is opening up to increasingly varied 
processes, especially management processes. Various types of 
coaching, relational meditation, and psychological resources all 
contain practices can often be traced to religious roots.13 No doubt 
there are also functional and instrumental approaches involved, but 
the scientific legitimation of spiritual techniques does not necessarily 
suffice to distinguish them from what might previously have been 
considered to be a religious practice. 
I. CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF THE IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED 
ENTERPRISE: RELIGION AS ETHICS 
The definition of the idea of the ideologically oriented enterprise 
has always been fairly vague.14 Its legal interest, however, exists only 
by virtue of the effects of the law which might be attached to it—
essentially linked to exemptions in terms of protected discrimination 
in hiring or firing for ideological reasons. While this theory originally 
developed in a fairly binary manner, the borders have now become 
blurred, especially as the attached effects lose their specificity. 
Following European Directive 2000/78/EC, only direct 
 
claim is that it’s the financial interests of the business under which he tries to escape the claim 
of ethnical discrimination, while in the second case, (the gay bar) it’s the desire of the gay 
minority to be able to get together that that is provided as a justification. The conflict between 
these fundamental freedoms can really only be found in the latter situation. In the first 
situation, the only pertinent question is to know what range to give the principle of 
proportionality, which contains the given guidelines outlining the concept of what is an 
“occupational requirement.”]  OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, DISCRIMINATIONS ET MARCHÉ DU 
TRAVAIL: LIBERTÉ ET ÉGALITÉ DANS LES RAPPORTS D’EMPLOI 68 (2001). This opposition is 
itself a sociological interpretation that other mutations will further complicate. The public 
debate on Quick halal restaurants shows other forms of fluidity between ethnic-type economy 
and identity-type economy. 
 13. F. Matthews-Giba, Religious Dimensions of Mediation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1695, 1703 (2000) (“The religious and spiritual pedigree of mediation is quite extensive, and 
the practice of using spiritual aspects of mediation still continues.”); Hendrika Vande Kemp, 
Making the History of Psychology Clinically and Philosophically Relevant, in HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 224, 232 (5th ed. 2002) (“Throughout the course I discuss the contributions 
that other great psychologists have made to the psychology of religion, religious psychology, 
and spiritually oriented psychotherapies.”) (citation omitted). 
 14. Benjamin Moses Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board Independence: Focus on 
Independent Stakeholders as a “Middle Way”, 99 KY. L.J. 731, 781 n.156 (2011) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (“A family worshipping together is engaged in a quintessentially 
private religious enterprise and therefore is not a church . . . . If membership does not extend 
beyond [the founder’s] immediate family, it would appear that plaintiff is engaged in a private 
religious enterprise, rather than a church.”). 
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discrimination based on religious or philosophical conviction is 
justified, even to the exclusion of all discrimination based on other 
grounds.15 Thus, the exemption of the key functions of the 
ideologically oriented enterprise does not, as such, concern gender, 
sexual orientation, race, language or, more broadly, certain practices 
motivated by belief. Legally, therefore, the issue is a fairly narrow 
one. Belgium’s Constitutional Court,16 however, has already shown 
on several occasions with regard to Belgian legislation that the 
narrow nature of this exemption is no constraint. Any problematic 
distinction other than religious or philosophical identity is steadily 
subjected to the common law which demands justification for any 
discrimination. This creates a system with a positive obligation to 
justify such actions, with judicial checks carried out after the event. If 
the legal effectiveness of the category of ideologically oriented 
enterprise tends to become subject to checking by proportionality 
over a long continuum of evaluation, we will see that the issues 
involved in a definition are themselves opening up to a distinctly 
more flexible approach. Hence the interest is no longer found in 
positive law alone. It also falls under an approach from legal 
anthropology, aimed at examining how legal practice will take into 
account the changes and developments mentioned in the 
introduction. 
In the definition given by Phillipe Ardant, and then used by 
Gérard Couturier, “ideologically oriented enterprises” are those 
enterprises which “do not limit themselves to supplying goods or 
services, but which claim to be representative of a philosophy, an 
ethic, an ideal inseparable from their goal.”17 However, what is the 
reach of this “inseparability”? Some classic examples illustrate this 
definition: “publishing companies; religious, educational or cultural 
institutions, etc.”18 However, these remain linked to the formal 
diffusion of a doctrine. The Italian literature on the topic has also 
 
 15. A future issue would arise about exclusions held by religious authorities: how should 
a religious decision of banishment or excommunication upheld as a condemnation vis-à-vis an 
attitude contrary to religious morality be viewed? 
 16. Cour Constitutionnelle, 17/2009, Feb. 12, 2009 (Belg.); Cour Constitutionnelle, 
2009/39, Mar. 11, 2009 (Belg.). 
 17. Phillipe Ardant, Les libertés du citoyen dans l’entreprise: Introduction au débat, 1982 
DROIT SOCIAL 428 (Fr.); Gérard Couturier, Droit du travail, in LIBERTÉS ET DROITS 
FONDAMENTAUX 295, 313 (M. Delmas-Marty & C. Lucas De Leyssac, eds., 1996) (La finalité 
propre des entreprises de tendances). 
 18. Ardant, supra note 17. 
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adopted definitions with unclear parameters. Thus, Francesco 
Santoni, in what was later used by Maria G. Mattarlo and Gaetano 
Lo Castro, held that ideology can “si riflette sia sulla natura degli 
scopi perseguiti, sia sull’attivita organizzata, alla quale devono 
risultare legate le prestazioni richieste in funzione strumentale 
rispetto alla realizzazione dei suoi fini caratteristici.”19 He thus left 
open the question of knowing precisely whether “la tendenza c.d. 
ideologica debba propriamente ritrovarsi nei fini dell’ente e li debba 
essere ricercata o se sia sufficiente ch’essa rappresenti il presupposto 
per l’esistenza dell’ente, la causa motiva ed efficiente di chi l’ha 
posto.”20 If ideologically oriented enterprises are only the collective 
implementation of religious freedom—by means of the freedoms of 
business, of teaching, and of association—then is it not possible to 
envision other “inseparable links” between the ideals and the aims of 
the business? What some authors call the degree of ideological 
coloration demanded of a business in order to meet the demands of 
“inseparability” is something that remains singularly difficult to 
identify. 
European Union law lends substantial weight to this 
examination. A comparison of Article 4 of Directive 2000/78/EC 
with the formulae initially foreseen in the planning clearly reveals 
European tensions. In the initial version, a narrow definition of 
ideologically oriented enterprises was outlined, restricting such 
enterprises to those “which have as their direct and essential 
objective ideological orientation in the field of religion or belief in 
relation to education, information and the expression of opinion.”21 
 
 19. FRANCESCO SANTONI, LE ORGANIZZAZIONI DI TENDENZA E I RAPPORTI DI 
LAVORO 3 (1983); MARIA G. MATTAROLO, IL RAPPORTO DI LAVORO SUBORDINATO NELLE 
ORGANIZZAZIONI DI TENDENZA: PROFILI GENERALI 92, 92-106 (1983); Gaetano Lo Castro, 
“Individuo e insieme”  nella organizzazioni di tendenza confessionale. Rifessioni generali, in 
RAPPORTO DI LAVORO E FATTORE RELIGIOSO 61 (1988) (ideology can “be reflected both in 
the nature of the purposes pursued and in the organized activity which the required services are 
necessarily bound in their instrumental function of its characteristic purpose.”). 
 20. Lo Castro, supra note 19, at 63 (“The trend toward so-called ideology should 
properly be found in the institution’s purposes and must be sought out whether it sufficiently 
represents a prerequisite for the institution’s existence, if the cause motivates the institution, 
and if it is efficient for that institution.”). 
 21. Proposition de directive du Conseil portant création d’un cadre général en faveur de 
l’égalité de traitement en matière d’emploi et de travail [Proposal for a Council Directive 
Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation], at 42, 
COM (1999) 565 final (June 27, 2000) (art. 4(2)), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0565&from=EN. 
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The final text offers a much broader definition, including 
“occupational activities within churches and other public or private 
organisations whose ethos is based on religion or belief.”22 This final 
text begins this regime only provisionally, so as to preserve already 
existing legislation or to copy legislation using national practices in 
existence at the time of the directive.23 This is what Belgian 
 
“Member States may provide that, in the case of public or private organisations which pursue 
directly and essentially the aim of ideological guidance in the field of religion or belief with 
respect to education, information and the expression of opinions, and for the particular 
occupational activities within those organisations which are directly and essentially related to 
that aim, a difference of treatment based on a relevant characteristic related to religion or belief 
shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these activities, the 
characteristic constitutes a genuine occupational qualification.” Id. 
 22. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 4(2), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0078. “Member 
States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or 
provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption 
of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and 
other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a 
difference of treatment based on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination 
where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried 
out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational 
requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This difference of treatment shall be 
implemented taking account of Member States’ constitutional provisions and principles, as well 
as the general principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another 
ground. Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall thus not 
prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is 
based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to 
require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s 
ethos.” Id. 
 23. E.g. Matthias Mahlmann, Prospects of German Antidiscrimination Law, 14 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1045, 1056–57 (2005) (“The [German] bill’s 
implementations again closely mirror the provisions of European law as far as labor relations 
are concerned. Different treatment based on a person’s religion or belief does not constitute 
discrimination in the case of occupational activities within churches or other public or private 
organizations where the ethos of the church or organization is based on religion or belief and 
where, having regard to the organization’s self-understanding, by reason of the nature of these 
activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute 
an essential, legal, and justified  occupational requirement. In addition, the bill provides that 
the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief does not prejudice the 
right of religious associations to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and 
with loyalty to the organization’s ethos.”) (citing Council Directive 2000/78); Dimitry 
Kochenov, Democracy and Human Rights-Not for Gay People?: EU Eastern Enlargement and 
Its Impact on the Protection of the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 459, 
480 (2007) (“In its 2002 Report, the Commission noted the fact that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation was institutionalized in the Hungarian armed forces. Surprisingly, 
the Commission only mentioned this fact without criticising Hungary for this policy, which 
amounts to a breach of the ECt.HR and Directive 2000/78/EC.”); id. at 461 (“Article 13 
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legislators finally put into practice in Article 13 of the law of May 10, 
2007,24 after having avoided the issue in the earlier legislation of 
February 25, 2003.25 
This criterion change from the aim of ideological promotion to 
the basis of the company lies at the very heart of the tension examined 
here: it extends the law’s application to other ideologically oriented 
enterprises such as restaurants, clinics,26 or any other organization 
 
EC allow[ed] for the adoption of the legislative measures prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and the Equal Treatment Directive that followed.”) (citing 
Council Directive 2000/78). 
 24. The Belgian Law of May 10, 2007 includes the broad wording of the directive, 
omitting, however, the concept of “ethics.” The Belgian provision covers both existing and 
future organizations: “Dans le cas des activités professionnelles des organisations publiques et 
privées, dont le fondement repose sur la conviction religieuse ou philosophique, une distinction 
directe fondée sur la conviction religieuse ou philosophique ne constitue pas une 
discrimination lorsque, en raison de la nature des activités ou du contexte dans lequel celles-ci 
sont exercées, la conviction religieuse ou philosophique constitue une exigence professionnelle 
essentielle, légitime et justifiée au regard du fondement de l’organisation. Sur base de cette 
disposition, aucune autre distinction directe fondée sur un autre critère protégé ne peut être 
justifié, à moins qu’elle ne le soit en application d’une autre disposition du présent titre. 
Pourvu que ses dispositions soient par ailleurs respectées, la présente loi ne porte pas préjudice 
au droit des organisations publiques ou privées dont le fondement repose sur la conviction 
religieuse ou philosophique de requérir des personnes travaillant pour elles une attitude de 
bonne foi et de loyauté envers l’éthique de l’organisation.” Loi tendant à lutter contre 
certaines formes de discrimination du May 10, 2007, Moniteur Belge (May 30, 2007) 
(emphasis added). [“In the case of professional activities of public and private organizations, 
whose foundation is based on religion or belief, direct discrimination based on religion or 
belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the activities or 
context in which they are exercised, religious or philosophical belief is a genuine occupational 
requirement, legitimate and justified under the foundation of the organization. On the basis of 
this provision, no other direct discrimination based on other criteria protected cannot be 
justified, unless it is under any other provision of this title. Provided that its provisions are 
otherwise complied with, this Act shall not prejudice the right of public and private 
organizations whose foundation is based on religion or belief to require individuals working for 
them to act in good faith and loyalty to the ethics of the organization.”] 
 25. LOUIS-LEON CHRISTIANS, LE PRINCIPE DE NON DISCRIMINATION RELIGIEUSE EN 
DROIT BELGE ET COMPARÉ : ENTRE OBLIGATIONS DU LÉGISLATEUR ET OBLIGATIONS DES 
CONTRACTANTS, in LE PRINCIPE DE NON DISCRIMINATION EN DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS  
143–207 (Patrick Wéry, & Sophie Stijns eds., 2006); PATRICK DE POOTER, DE 
DOORWERKING VAN HET GELIJKHEIDSBEGINSEL IN DE RELIGIEUZE GEMEENSCHAPPEN EN 
LEVENSBESCHOUWELIJKE GROEPEN 489–509 (2003); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, supra note 12, 
at 71–77 (“Les entreprises de tendances” [Business Trends]); YVES STOX, DISCRIMINATIE EN 
IDENTITEIT: IDENTITEITSGEBONDEN WERKGEVERS IN HET EUROPEES EN BELGISCH 
ARBEIDSRECHT (2010). 
 26. Compare hospitals organized by religious orders, MICHELINE JAMOULLE, LE 
CONTRAT DE TRAVAIL, PRÉCIS DE LA FACULTÉ DE DROIT DE LIÈGE  55 (1986) and W. Rauws 
& H. Schyvens, De bescherming van werknemersgrondrechten binnen de individuele 
arbeidsverhouding, in K. RIMANQUE, DE TOEPASSELIJKHEID VAN DE GRONDRECHTEN IN 
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whose ethos might have a religious or philosophical foundation,27 an 
extension which might have been uncertain under earlier Belgian 
legislation. 
The abandonment of the reference to “ethos” in the Belgian law 
of May 10, 2007 is a lapse that reveals the fear of an excessively 
“ethical” extension of the concept of the ideologically oriented 
enterprise. In any event, the preparatory work does not mention any 
consideration other than the desire to have an exact transcription of 
the formula of the European Directive. Further, it is necessary that 
the basis of the enterprise has not just any kind of ethical referent but 
a “religious or philosophical conviction.” A “purely” cultural 
tradition or an ethos judged to be “purely” professional would not 
benefit from these arrangements. On the other hand, nothing allows 
us to think that political parties, in the classical view, would 
henceforth be excluded. 
The announced extension, which is definite in its principle, 
nevertheless remains ambiguous in its scope. How, for example, can 
one distinguish clearly between a professional ethos and a 
philosophical foundation? The secularization of ideologies leads to 
eroding borders in post-modern societies and old reference points 
are poorly adapted to take these changes into account. 
A first point may be easily understood in light of a classic 
doctrine: the simple religious conviction of the entrepreneur is not 
sufficient to establish the basis of an ideologically oriented enterprise, 
 
PRIVATE VERHOUDINGEN  223 (Anterpen: Kluwer 1982) (discussing Catholic charities) with 
Rommelfanger v. Fed. Republic of Ger., App. No. 12242/86, 62 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 151 (1989) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
1010#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-1010%22]}. 
 27. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Stormans 
Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Compare N. K. Kubasek, D. C. 
Tagliarina & C. Staggs, The Questionable Constitutionality of Conscientious Objection Clauses 
for Pharmacists, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 225 (2007) with Pichon and Sajous v. France,  App. No. 
49853199-2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 371 (no conscientious objection for catholic pharmacists) 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
22644#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-22644%22]}; Eric Fouassier, Doctrine, pharmacie, vers une 
clause de conscience du pharmacien d’officine?, 2003 REVUE DE DROIT SANITAIRE ET SOCIAL, 
43 (Fr.); Julien Raynaud, Note de jurisprudence, à propos de l’arrêt de la cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme section 3 du 2 octobre 2001, infractions économiques et droits de l’homme, des 
pharmaciens ne peuvent arguer de leurs croyances religieuses pour refuser de vendre les pilules 
contraceptives, 2002 J.C.P.E. 1149. In Belgium, a more balanced decision of the Order of 
Pharmacists: Ch. Laporte, Un pharmacien ne peut abuser de sa clause de conscience lors d’une 
garde [A pharmacist cannot abuse its conscience clause in a custody], LA LIBRE BELGIQUE 
(Dec. 19, 2007). 
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even if a number of stipulations may have been attached to that 
religion in the staff’s employment contracts. In other words, the 
nature of the business eludes a purely subjective determination and is 
in this regard removed from the autonomy of individual will.28 It is 
in this sense that the lease is not held to be foundational of an 
“ideologically oriented” relation since the religious conviction alone 
of the lessor is not sufficient to give the enterprise this confessional 
coloration.29 This is clearly an operation of state classification, a true, 
public recognition of the specific character of an enterprise. 
Admitting (or denying) that all activity apparently “secular” can 
be redefined religiously (or philosophically) and hence be classified 
by the law as such, clearly raises the question once again of the self-
definition by the business of its religious or philosophical foundation, 
and the extent of that foundation. It seems difficult, at first sight, to 
be able to detect this “second-degree world” other than with the 
view and internal ideas specific to the tradition in question. Indeed, 
what State control might one imagine that does not raise it up as 
censor? The very act of identifying the foundation will certainly be 
explained by the incidence of dominant social ideas and, as a result, 
vary depending on whether the religion in question is a majority or 
minority one. However, it would then run the risk, once again, of 
constituting a discriminatory process.30 
The field of ideologically oriented enterprises, depending on 
their degree of independence, would be close, mutatis mutandis, to 
that of the individual conscientious objector encountered above and 
would thus call for comparative discussion. Without doubt, this is no 
longer a matter of taking into account the conformity with a religion 
of a given behavior, but more broadly of examining the intensity of 
the religious “reassumption” of the secular activity.31 This question 
 
 28.  See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to 
Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719 (1996) (distinguishing the case 
of religious ethos enterprises, commercial enterprises whose employer requires compliance with 
certain religious norms, and finally the case of enterprises with religious harassment between 
employees). 
 29.  Compare with Melissa Fishman Cordish, A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Free 
Exercise Rights and Anti-Discrimination Law, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2113 (1996). 
 30. Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the Modern Constraints of the Establishment Clause: 
Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, Endorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARQ. L. 
REV. 903, 908 (1992). 
 31. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining 
Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. REV. 77, 85 
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of field of application will not be that, for example, of the kosher 
conformity of meat sold by a Jewish butcher’s, but rather the 
recognition of the religious nature—or lack thereof—of this 
activity.32 However, by embarking on this type of examination, a 
new objection might arise that relates, in a new way, to the principle 
of equality. The same economic activity might, in fact, be classified 
in different ways depending on the religion of which it concerns. 
Not all religious faiths have the same hold on economic realities.33 
The butcher shop owned by a Catholic would not have the same 
characteristics as those of a kosher butcher. Similarly, the simple act 
of exclusively selling halal hamburgers would not, in itself, raise a 
restaurant to the status of ideologically oriented enterprise, whereas a 
restaurant which identified itself as halal or Muslim likely would. 
This variety of classification, however, does not appear at all to be 
discriminatory, qualitate qua. On the contrary, it would simply take 
account of a factual difference in the degree of the ideological hold 
over a secular activity. To deny the specific character of a kosher 
butcher would lead to as many paradoxes as applying the regime of 
ideologically oriented enterprises to a Catholic butcher. 
Careful work is called for. Self-definition, while being necessary 
to establish a business as an ideologically-oriented enterprise, does 
not seem sufficient. The European Court of Human Rights 
emphasizes whether a certain behaviour or belief is a “central and 
necessary part” of a person’s religious convictions versus behavior 
that is “simply motivated” by that religious conviction when 
determining whether a person should be exempt from certain rules 
or laws.34 Perhaps the same could be done when determining 
whether certain behaviours of businesses should be enough to label 
it as an ideologically oriented enterprise. However, whatever 
 
(2004). 
 32. Geneviève Koubi, Droit et religions: dérives ou inconséquences de la logique de 
conciliation, 108 REV. DR. PUBLIC, 725, 742 (1992) (Fr.); Geneviève Koubi, Le rite contre la 
règle. Réflexions à partir de Paris 25 mai 1990, Brami c. Arbib, in LES RELIGIONS EN FACE DU 
DROIT - LES CAHIERS D’ACTION JURIDIQUE, 47, nn. 79–80 (1992); Jean Villaceque, Note sous 
Paris 30 mars 1990 et 25 mai 1990, Aff. Fraternité Pie X c. Painsecq et aff. Arbib c. Brami, 1990 
DALLOZ 596 (Fr.) (kosher restaurant). 
 33. Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism’s Last Sigh?: The Hindu Right, the 
Courts, and India’s Struggle for Democracy, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 113 (1997). 
 34. Robert H. Nelson, Rethinking Church and State: The Case of Environmental 
Religion, 29 PACE. ENVTL. L. REV. 121, 129 (2011).  Carolyn Evans, The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L. 52, 55–56 (2006). 
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minimum standard is used to protect the preferences of businesses 
that try to be ideologically oriented cannot reduce the more effective 
guarantees contained in European Directive 78/2000/EC and the 
Belgian law of May 10, 2007.35 Even in this context, it is not enough 
to formally discuss the “religious or philosophical” self-signification 
of a secular activity, but rather, of considering the religious and 
philosophical efforts that the business makes, so as to reveal, at the 
margins, a simple foundation whose religious and philosophical 
nature might be detected in a not unreasonable way and with no 
discriminatory effects. 
Beyond the changes in the Muslim market, a much greater 
diversification of religious and philosophical resources is in store in 
the near future, whether in the wider context by means of 
movements for ethical labelling for companies, or by means of 
business culture. The emergence of “wild religiosity” might not be 
limited to individual phenomena but might reach the business 
world.36 The criterion of “religious or philosophical foundation” will 
need to be able to meet these new challenges. 
The first major interpretive challenge for the law occurred in 
2008 in both Belgium and France in cases concerning what weight 
to give to a statement of business culture that transposes to the 
company, mutatis mutandis, the constitutional characteristics of the 
state (French secularism37 or Belgian neutrality38). Should one see 
here an ideologically oriented enterprise whose philosophical 
foundation might be secularism or neutrality, or just a standard 
business? Or even, should this statement of business culture fail to 
attain the substance of a foundation, will it just be a standard 
business? And in this case, would the legal relevance of this business 
statement vary depending on the selected referent according to 
whether or not this related to the constitutional features specific to 
the authorities? Would such a business be allowed to directly 
 
 35. See Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010). 
 36. Shmuel Trigano, In Search of Eternal Israel, Back to an Intellectual Journey, in 
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 467 (Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson & Aaron V. Hughes eds., 2014). 
 37. See Katayoun Alidadi, Opening Doors to Muslim Minorities in the Workplace? From 
India’s Employment Quota to EU and Belgian Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 23 PACE INT’L 
L. REV. 146, 152 (2011) (“Under French law, workers are said to have no religious rights, as 
employers have no legal obligation to accommodate religious practice.”). 
 38. See STOX, supra note 25. 
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discriminate against potential employees based on behaviour that is 
not compatible with its “neutral” or “secular” philosophy? 
Without taking a clear position on these theories, the Cour de 
Travail (Employment Court) of Brussels39 approved the firing of a 
female sales assistant of the Club bookshops for a “serious fault,” 
namely, the wearing of a headscarf. The Court noted that “freedom 
of religion is not at issue here: the company did not reproach the 
appellant for belonging to the Islamic religion but only for having 
arrived at work displaying an ostentatious religious sign, despite 
recommendations – that apply to all members of staff – according to 
which workers in contact with customers must not only wear 
clothing that bears the company’s commercial branding but must, in 
addition, abstain from displaying signs or clothing that might 
damage the ‘open, available, plain, family and neutral’ brand image 
of the company. The freedom to display one’s religion is not absolute; 
restrictions are possible when religious practices are of a nature to 
provoke disorder. The internal practice of a commercial company 
forbidding staff in contact with customers to wear certain types of 
clothing that do not conform to neutrality, and more precisely the 
wearing of the religious veil, rests on objective considerations specific 
to the brand image of the commercial company. Such practice, which 
applies to workers or a category of workers, is not discriminatory.”40 
How much leeway is a company allowed in adopting a “culture” 
that imposes certain “policies concerning religious matters” without 
at the same time being discriminatory? The business concerned in 
the Brussels judgement wanted an image that was both open and 
neutral, close to the image of the state itself. Might one see in it “a 
philosophical foundation” or simply view it as normal practice for a 
standard business? Would a different philosophical option, for 
example a pluralist or syncretistic one, have received the same 
positive treatment in court? Would a standard business be permitted 
to engage in these practices, or did its choices turn the business into 
an ideologically oriented enterprise, assuming the ‘brand image’ 
 
 39. C.T. Bruxelles, J.T.T. (Jan. 15, 2008) at 140; Cf. Cynthia DeBula Baines, L’Affaire 
Des Foulards—Discrimination, or the Price of a Secular Public Education System?, 29 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 303, 324 (1996) (citing Hijab Report Is Right on the Mark; Schools Should Heed 
Advice and Stop Discrimination, GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 16, 1995, at B2) (explaining that 
according to the Quebec Human Rights Committee, “the hijab should only be banned when 
it is demonstrated—and not just presumed—that public order or sexual equality is in danger”). 
 40. C.T. Bruxelles, J.T.T. (Jan. 15, 2008) at 140 (emphasis added). 
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pushed by the business reached the intensity of a foundation 
(religious or philosophical)? 
The route taken by the Brussels Cour du Travail might in any 
case be compared to the positions the famous Stasi Report took up 
in a chapter on the “secularism” of French businesses in common 
law, giving one to understand that in France the neutrality of 
business cultures ought not, perhaps, to be a freedom, but rather an 
obligation. 41 
On the other hand, the positions taken by the Haute Autorité de 
lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité (HALDE, translated 
as “High authority for the struggle against discrimination and for 
equality”) are different overall to those of the Brussels Cour du 
Travail. A ruling42 on January 26, 2009, confirmed by a second 
ruling of April 6, 2009,43 stated in fact that the “principle of 
neutrality,” applicable to the authorities, cannot be transposed or 
invoked by a private company in order to claim to limit, by itself 
alone, the religious freedom of expression of employees. In other 
words, according to our analysis, HALDE believes that the 
contractual invocation of secularism does not in itself convert a 
business into an ideologically oriented enterprise on a philosophical 
foundation (which would free it from increased legal checks) but, on 
 
 41. COMMISSION STASI, LAÏCITÉ ET RÉPUBLIQUE, RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE, LA DOCUMENTATION FRANÇAISE 3.2, 3.2.3, and 4.2.3 (Paris 2004); compare 
with U.S. law, Laura S. Underkuffler, Discrimination on the Basis of Religion: An Examination 
of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581(1989). 
 42. Deliberation Relative a une Clause, HALDE, (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.halde.
fr/Deliberation-relative-a-une-clause,12796.html (The contractual clause negatively assessed 
by the HALDE provides  that “l’entreprise est un lieu neutre et la neutralité implique 
notamment le respect des conceptions philosophiques, idéologiques ou religieuses des salariés 
et le respect de leur libre exercice public et manifestations en entreprise. Toutefois, ces 
croyances et leurs manifestations ne doivent en aucun cas devenir une entrave, même mineure, 
au bon fonctionnement de l’entreprise. En conséquence, nous requérons la plus grande 
neutralité dans la tenue vestimentaire et le comportement de nos salariés.”) [The company is a 
neutral environment, and such neutrality significantly implies the respect of the philosophical, 
ideological or religious beliefs of employees and the respect of their right to public practice (of 
such beliefs) in the workplace. That being said, these beliefs and practices should in no way 
become obstacles, even minor ones, to the normal operation of the business. Therefore, we 
require the highest degree of neutrality in the dress and behavior of our employees.].  The 
same opinion has been ruled by the French Court of cassation (ass. pl.), June 25, 2014, in the 
famous Baby Loup case. See S. HENNETTE-VAUCHEZ, V. VALENTIN, L' AFFAIRE BABY LOUP 
OU LA NOUVELLE LAÏCITÉ (Paris, 2014).  
 43. Deliberation Relative aux Regales Fixees, HALDE, (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.halde.fr/Deliberation-relative-aux-regles.html. 
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the contrary, it is still subject to the demands relating to a standard 
business. In a standard business, the mere invocation of an ideology, 
even if the ideology mirrors a constitutional feature of the Republic, 
does not result in the immunising effect of the controls of common 
law, except in the case that the invocation reaches the strength of a 
foundation. 
After abandoning the test of “the direct and essential objective” 
in favour of any “ethos based on religion or conviction,” European 
law is now dealing head-on with contemporary changes and ethical 
diversification in businesses. While the Directive opens this Pandora’s 
Box only in relation to already existing situations, the same does not 
hold true for much national legislation. The future will tell if these 
issues will truly be encountered in a non-discriminatory way. 
II. CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT METHODS: SPIRITUALITY AS A 
NEUTRAL METHOD? 
Without returning to the (often poorly interpreted) theses of 
Max Weber44 on the Protestant origins of capitalism, one is forced to 
take note of the new breadth of sociological and economic work 
devoted to the micro and macro influences of religious contexts, 
traditions, and psychologies on the spread of economies and 
markets.45 But what attracts the attention of legal analysis here is 
another related phenomenon: that of the increasing power of 
management methods linked to the substantial or functional 
 
 44. ECONOMICS AND RELIGION: ARE THEY DISTINCT? (H. Geoffrey Brennan & 
A.M.C. Waterman eds., vol. 39, 1994); KURT SAMUELSSON, ECONOMIE ET RELIGION: UNE 
CRITIQUE DE MAX WEBER (1971); KURT SAMUELSSON, RELIGION AND ECONOMIC ACTION: 
THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, THE RISE OF CAPITALISM AND THE ABUSES OF SCHOLARSHIP (E. 
Geoffrey French ed., 1993). 
 45. For a macro-approach, see BRUNO COLMANT, ECONOMIE EUROPEENNE: 
L’INFLUENCE DES RELIGIONS (2008); M. Noland, Religions, islam et croissance économique, 2 
REVUE FRANCAISE DE GESTION 97–118 (2007); Rodney Wilson, ECONOMICS, ETHICS AND 
RELIGION: JEWISH, CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIM ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1997).  For a micro-
approach, see Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, People’s Opium? Religion and 
Economic Attitudes, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 225–82 (2003); Eilert Herms, Religion, Ethics, the 
Economy and Economics, 153 J. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 182–206 (1997). 
Compare the “Law and Economics” literature, Richard A. Posner, Michael W. McConnell, An 
Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989); L. Panafit, Les 
relations religions-Etats en Europe au prisme de l’économique, in Pont-Chelini, B., dir., RELIGIONS, 
DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉS DANS L’EUROPE COMMUNAUTAIRE 49–71 (2000); L.R. Iannaccone, R. 
Finke, R. Stark, Deregulating religion: the economics of church and state, 35(2) ECON. INQUIRY 
350–64 (1997). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:06 PM 
565 Ideologically Oriented Enterprises 
 581 
effectiveness ascribed to ‘spiritual’ resources. Far from being a 
marginal or exotic fact, in the United States, the use of ‘corporate 
spirituality’ is steadily spreading beyond minority fundamentalist 
practice.46 It is no longer necessarily a practice in tune with an 
identified religious conviction but, where necessary, a strategy with 
allegedly scientific justification that utilizes the effectiveness of 
particular mental resources and the embodied traces of resources 
once largely associated with religious traditions. The growing 
breadth of contributions to such issues in the specialist literature47 is 
a sign that it should to be taken seriously. 
Legal analysis will not remain untouched. Will these new 
managerial approaches be able to pass the European test of religious 
freedom within standard companies? Or, if the answer is ‘no,’ is it 
possible to formalise, under the conditions required by the legal 
instruments, the integration of this type of business within the 
 
 46. Lake Lambert, SPIRITUALITY, INC.: RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 
(2009). 
 47. Blake E. Ashforth & Michael G. Pratt, Institutionalized Spirituality: An Oxymoron?, 
in HANDBOOK OF WORKPLACE SPIRITUALITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 93–107 
(R. Giacalone & C. Jurkiewicz eds., 2003); Blake E. Ashforth & Deepa Vaidyanath, Work 
Organizations as Secular Religions, 11 J. MGMT. INQUIRY, 359–70 (2002) ; Jerry Biberman & 
Michael Whitty, A Postmodern Spiritual Future at Work, 10 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
MGMT. 130–38 (1997); D.M. Boje, Critical Theory Approaches to Spirituality in Business, in 
SPIRITUALITY IN BUSINESS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 160–87 (2008); 
Cathy Driscoll & Elden Wiebe, Technical Spirituality at Work: Jacques Ellul on Workplace 
Spirituality, 16 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 333–48 (2007); Theodora Issa & David Pick, An 
Interpretive Mixed-Methods Analysis of Ethics, Spirituality and Aesthetics in the Australian 
Services Sector, 20 BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 45–58 (2011); Douglas A. Hicks, RELIGION 
AND THE WORKPLACE: PLURALISM, SPIRITUALITY, LEADERSHIP (2003); Carole L. Jurkiewicz 
& Robert A. Giacalone, A Values Framework for Measuring the Impact of Workplace 
Spirituality on Organizational Performance, 49 J. BUS. ETHICS 129–42 (2004); D.J. Koys, 
Integrating Religious Principles and Human Resources Management Activities, 5 TEACHING 
BUS. ETHICS 121–39 (2001); Jeffrey S. Lewis & Gary D. Geroy, Employee Spirituality in the 
Workplace: A Cross-Cultural View for the Management of Spiritual Employees, 24 J. OF MGMT. 
EDUC. 682–94 (2000); Josep M. Lozano & Raimon Ribera, A New Chance for 
Management—A New Challenge for Spirituality, in SPIRITUALITY AND ETHICS IN 
MANAGEMENT 175–85 (L. Zsolnai ed., 2004); DAVID W. MILLER, GOD AT WORK: THE 
HISTORY AND PROMISE OF THE FAITH AT WORK MOVEMENT (2007); Ashish Pandey & Rajen 
K. Gupta, Spirituality in Management: A Review of Contemporary and Traditional Thoughts 
and Agenda for Research, 9 GLOBAL BUS. REV. 65–83 (2008); Douglas Polley, Jay Vora & 
P.N. SubbaNarasimha, Paying the Devil His Due: Limits and Liabilities of Workplace 
Spirituality, 13 INT’L J. ORG’L ANALYSIS 50–63 (2005); Cecile Rozuel & Nada Kakabadse, 
Ethics, Spirituality and Self: Managerial Perspective and Leadership Implications, 19 BUS. 
ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 423–36 (2010); Keyur B. Thaker, Approaches to Implement Spirituality 
in Business, 15 J. HUMAN VALUES 185–98 (2009). 
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category of organizations with a religious or philosophical 
foundation? This return of the religious—but in what form?—
however, is not made explicit as such. It grows in a double mode of 
secularization and of neutralization. On the one hand, only a 
‘method’ of management is put forward in a performance 
scientifically justified and without its religious origin necessarily 
being emphasised. On the other hand, the ambivalence of the 
concept of ‘spirituality’ must clearly be perceived: it relates more to 
morale than to morality, less to soteriological thought than to the 
psychology of mind, less to conscience-Gewissen than to 
consciousness-Bewusstsein. These slippages shift the legal question 
of freedom of religion towards the wider protection of the integrity 
of private life, itself susceptible to being opposed even to confirmed 
scientific claims. It is nevertheless in the gaps of this movement that 
distinct areas of dispute might reveal themselves, mainly through 
instrumentally abusive control issues.48 
A first sign of them may perhaps be found in a procedure at the 
Versailles appeal court49 relating to professional coaching carried out 
by a sub-contracting company, which it later became clear had links 
with Scientology. There was no criticism of the good results achieved 
in the personnel training. Only the origin of the trainer was called 
into question, and more particularly, a number of approaches felt to 
be proselytising, although these were limited to coffee breaks. No 
doubt the core of this dispute related to the socially controversial 
nature of Scientology, but the fact that this organization attempted 
 
 48. See Marjolein Lips-Wiersma, et al., Theorizing the Dark Side of the Workplace 
Spirituality Movement, 18 J. OF MGMT. INQUIRY 288, 293 and fig. 1 (2009) (investigating the 
four quadrants of workplace spirituality (WPS)—seduction, evangelization, manipulation, and 
subjugation—in order to propose a Critical Workplace Spirituality (CWPS)); see also Dennis 
Tourish & Naheed Tourish, Spirituality at Work, and its Implications for Leadership and 
Followership: A Post-Structuralist Perspective, 6 LEADERSHIP 207–24 (2010). Some authors 
propose new answers for conciliating spirituality and management, not as a way to stimulate 
employee’s energy at work but to guarantee a reasonable level of personal expression. Kathy 
Lund Dean & Scott R. Safranski, No Harm, No Foul? Organizational Intervention in 
Workplace Spirituality, 31 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 359–71 (2008). 
 49. See Catherine Pherivong, Note de jurisprudence, à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de 
Versailles du 22 mars 2001, le refus de salariés de participer à un séminaire suspecté d’être infiltré 
par une secte ne constitue pas un acte d’insubordination, 89 JURISPRUDENCE SOCIALE: LAMY 
22 (2001); Christophe Willmann, La bonne foi contractuelle et les convictions religieuses, note sur 
Versailles 23 janvier 1998. J.C.P.E., 1999, no. 21. Compare with Cour de cassation de France 
[Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], 17 octobre 1973, JCP, 1973, II, 17698, note Y. Saint-
Jours. 
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to describe itself as a ‘Church’ was not without importance. The 
suspicion that a hidden religious dimension is disguised under 
scientific appearances might also have supplied grounds for the 
liveliness of reactions in the case. We see that the level of 
performance of the management or training technique will not be 
sufficient to remove the question of the origin of the technique from 
the background of such cases. Will we have to envisage an obligation 
to reveal non-membership of a socially controversial50 or secret 
movement,51 as well as of the insignificance or religious or 
philosophical harmlessness of the technique offered? 52 
III. CONCLUSION 
The legal regulation of religious diversity at work is a test for 
contemporary claims to social pluralism. On the one hand, it is 
necessary to find a balance between the right to differentiate and the 
right to discriminate, between the right to remain silent regarding 
one’s affiliations and the freedom to express them.53 On the other 
hand, it is necessary to balance the status of the enterprise between a 
policy of non-discrimination and an emerging movement towards 
ethical diversification, without confusing the across-the-board 
application of human rights with an across-the-board (and self-
contradictory) extension of the principle of pluralism and neutrality54 
that is the province of the state to corporations.55 Other issues have 
also appeared in the light of a legal anthropology of the religious and 
its contemporary, or even postmodern, forms. The individualization 
 
 50. VASSILIS SAROGLOU, LOUIS-LÉON CHRISTIANS, CORALIE BUXANT, & STEFANIA 
CASALFIORE, MOUVEMENTS RELIGIEUX CONTESTES. PSYCHOLOGIE, DROIT ET POLITIQUES 
DE PRECAUTION (2005). 
 51. Compare with Siveri & Chiellini v. Italy, App. No. 13148/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2008). 
 52. Compare with litigation related to the choice of some student restaurant which 
serves only halal food, holding that non-believers may remain indifferent to the symbolic ritual 
efficacy in which they do not believe, or even to question of the definition of yoga as a 
religious or a sport practice. See Walter A. Effross, Owning Enlightenment: Proprietary 
Spirituality in the “New Age” Marketplace, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 483 (2003). 
 53. See generally LUCY VICKERS, RELIGION AND BELIEF DISCRIMINATON IN 
EMPLOYMENT—THE EU LAW, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2006), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2013&langId=en. 
 54. See Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 657.  
 55. On the tension between the liberal tradition and religious liberty, see Aldir Guedes 
Soriano, Liberal Democracy and the Right to Religious Freedom, 2013 BYU L. REV. 581. 
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and flexibility of forms of beliefs and philosophies modify the 
tensions between the ethnic identification of the religious and its re-
emerging ethical dimension. Articulating diversity management 
while strengthening the link to ethical conscience, or rebuilding it on 
an engineering of “handicapping” cultural traits, is not a neutral 
choice. Between increasingly uneasy anticipation or increasingly less 
valid revelation, how can one open up a method that continues to 
give satisfaction to the process of humanization and to the freedom 
to speak one’s difference in a diversified space? One can imagine that 
there is not one single answer to this question, but that several 
answers might coexist by means, for example, of the market’s 
diversified ethical choices. Finally, diversity is not only manifested 
within companies or between companies but is also apparent in the 
secular reappropriation of managerial resources stored in spirituality 
usage or in philosophical wisdom. The interrelationships between a 
spiritual component of management and the classical issues about 
religion in workplace56 will become an important legal issue for 
Europe in the near future. 
Islam will ask Europe each of these questions,57 and in doing so, 
will profoundly affect our varied and complex postmodern systems, 
redefining traditional notions of the ethnic, the ethical, the religious, 
the philosophical, the cultural and the rational. It is within the 
eternal quest to reconcile the body and mind (“labora et ora,”58 
physical confines and mental freedom, etc.) that a new and vital part 
of the legal treatment of diversity might play its part.59 
 
 56. Don G. Schley, Legal Aspects of Spirituality in the Workplace, 31 INT’L J. OF PUB. 
ADMIN. 342, 354 (2008) (“Management scholars must delve into such issues more deeply, 
rather than following the increasing tendency in secular academic culture to dismiss religion as 
a negative external influence or factor, while embracing a nebulous, ill-defined and all-
encompassing and purely internal spirituality as somehow positive (as long as it serves their 
purposes). Danger lies in that direction, too, as expressed by John Whitehead: ‘. . . any 
attempts to impose (either directly or indirectly) a common value system will violate equal 
protection principles inherent in the American system of justice.’”). 
 57. See Toni Johnson, Europe: Integrating Islam, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(July 25, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/religion/europe-integrating-islam/p8252#p2. 
 58.  The Benedictine motto “ora et labora” is Latin for “pray and work” or “pray and 
labor.” The phrase refers to the monastic practice of combining prayer with work. St. Benedict 
viewed prayer and work as partners. “We need both contemplation and action.” LONNI COLLINS 
PRATT & DANIEL HOMAN, BENEDICT’S WAY: AN ANCIENT MONK’S INSIGHTS FOR A BALANCED 
LIFE 47 (2000). 
 59. Reinhold Fahlbeck, Ora et Labora—On Freedom of Religion at the Work Place: A 
Stakeholder cum Balancing Factors Model, 20 INT’L. J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 27, 33 
(2004). 
